Bernstein, in the first lecture part on the “Introduction” chapter in the Phenomenology, has this very interesting bit about this quote from Hegel near the end: “The Concept, when it has developed into a concrete existence that is itself free, is nothing other than the I, … Continue reading Comment: The Unity of Self, Concept, and the World
Following from my first post about dialectics as immanent critique, the most bare form of Hegel’s method, the second of my posts on this shall now concern one aspect of the general method. “But wait, A.W., didn’t you say that there isn’t a formulaic method to … Continue reading Hegel’s Form of Science
The method of the Phenomenology’s development is mysterious to the uninitiated, but even when you understand the movement of the method you cannot help but wonder: why this method with this content and in this manner? The lack of justification or explanation of the method in the … Continue reading PhoS: Is There Justification of Method?