The All of Everything: The Universal Individuality
Freedom is self-determination. That which determines and that which is determined are one and the same. For the free being there is no source of being, cause, form, or content, that is an other to it. Freedom as such is not merely absolute, but the Absolute. The free is not given, but gives itself to itself, yet if it is not given in any way… how could it ever come to be? Consider why this is a problem to think about: If freedom is not given as what it is, but has to give itself what it is, how does it make sense that whatever it gives itself to be would be free in the beginning? The issue lies in that at the beginning it could not possibly be explicitly free. Whatever a free being begins its self-determining trajectory as would not at first appear as a trajectory from or to anything else, for such a relationship would be given by an other, that which precedes it as a cause or reason for it. But if it has no prior reason, whatever it is at first has no reason for being what it is. It is given, but what it is is not given. We do not yet know what it is or can be, we can only let it be and see. Only in letting the self-determining being play itself out can we grasp how it can become free in-and-for-itself, i.e. how it was free before it gave itself the freedom to be what it initially was and would become.
At the end of the Doctrine of Essence in the Science of Logic Hegel proclaims that the forms of necessity are overcome, that the sphere of other-determination or privileged relation of positor over posited is no more. The next and final general movement of the Science of Logic is the Doctrine of the Concept, wherein freedom is beginning and end. No more can one thing determine the other, all further determinations are self-determinations of one and the same. To be free is not to choose capriciously, nor to choose merely from given options. No, to be free is to determine the very options, the very determinations, which are to accrue to the self. These determinations, however, do not arise capriciously or arbitrarily, and without having a determinate element to their further determination. What makes them free is that their necessity follows from, reproduces, and confirms the elements in which they initially appear. In this way the determinations are self-determinations from within, not from an outside other, and in these determinations a life which enjoys its vitality in its self-production exists. To the common understanding this is unintelligible, nonetheless an attempt must be made to illuminate the turbid shadows of this claim.
The Concrete Universal
What follows is necessarily abstractly logical. What is spoken about with terms like the universal or the concept is not a thing, but a general abstract position of a moment of intelligibility in the process of self-intelligibility, self-determination, and absoluteness. That which is absolutely stands within itself and is determined fully by itself, and so it is necessary that its form and expression involve self-reflexion. The point of this logical exposition, or rather, this example, is to show how something can produce itself without assuming itself. In so producing itself, it reveals that it is the source of itself, that it is what makes itself what it is, i.e. that it is self-determining or free.
Behold! The universal, the all of everything—so we tend to think. The universal is universal only insofar as it distinguishes itself from and subsumes the particular. Being so distinguished, it is determined not as the infinite universality, but as itself a finite particularity, for the universal is not the all if it is distinguished from and opposite to the particular—it is parted from the particular, hence it is particular. Falling into particularity along with the particular, the absolute as particular stands distinguished and opposed to itself as itself, for what is parted from the particular is the particular itself. Now, the particular does not specify any entity since it too generalizes just like the universal, and so is indistinct from it. But the particular does not fall once more into the beginning of abstract indistinct universality, rather its distinction from itself, as particular against particular, is a difference which implies in it something not indifferent about particulars. This self-opposition of particularity is grasped as the step to the truth. The particular universal and universal particular are distinguished as specific particulars, i.e. this particular and that particular. The particularized particular specifies itself amongst particulars, not a part, but this part—the individual. The universal, the-all-of-everything, therefore steps forward from nebulous and aetherial abstraction as a self-determined individual. The concretely universal concept is the individual, it encompasses all three moments in itself not as a particular individual, but the individual universal or universal individual which has its universality, particularity, and individuality immanent to it as its self-generated distinctions. It is the absolutely self-determining concept. Where there is one, there are two, and where there are two there are three. The first distinguishes itself as one from the illusion of many, so the one becomes two (the one and many). The two determine and constitute themselves in the mutual distinction which is their shared unity, and this unity is the third (the one that as one is many and as many is one). It is not a third against them, but it is distinct as their totality, the individual whole or universal of the parts. The third is the whole which the first two produce in their relation, and which are produced as two from it. How does the third produce the first two? Insofar as it is the whole, it is the one; insofar as it is one… the logic repeats.
From the abstractly universal we see the concretely individual arise. The immediate universal is abstract or indeterminate, it holds itself apart from all finitude and partedness to a radical degree in which its partedness is apart from it. The particular is the abstract against itself, it is the determinate which is distinct or defined through not being; it is itself by denying it is the other which faces it—in this case it is the universal against the particular. The concrete is the grasp that the abstract is abstract—it is parted, defined, determinate or existent—only by virtue of the opposition which faces it, and this opposite is itself an abstraction as well. The concrete is the abstraction of abstraction in and through itself, grasped as this total unity. It is not abstraction as such immediately, or an abstraction which is mediated by something else not abstract, but this abstraction which grasps that it is abstraction only as part, and part only as with the other part from and with which it is parted, and so it is self-mediated abstraction which is in-and-through-itself. More importantly, it is at the point of concretion the abstraction, for the whole alone stands as absolutely parted from partedness by having that partedness internal to it; it is fully self-contained and absolute. It is this independence, this freedom, of concreteness which abstraction as such pretends to yet cannot achieve.
This or that in our experienced life is picked out by our consciousness, assumed to able to stand on its own independently, yet it is revealed to be incapable of such independence. We are attempting to abstract when we act as if we are independent, as if the world and other people are not affecting us nor us affecting them, but existential abstraction has a way to bite back which conceptual abstraction does not. With concepts we almost never realize that our abstractions are impossible, that they cannot succeed because they are not capable of keeping themselves isolated and absolute. Why? Because concepts are the very intelligible frame of the world; without a very specific effort on the part of a thinker to consider the frame itself, concepts are generally an invisible ‘filter’ which is so pervasive that it is extremely rare that anyone realizes the filter is even there.
The individual immediately is as a whole the simple totality which is objectivity. It is self-enclosed and self-determined such that any further interaction only externally and contingently constitutes it, but never enters into its determination, nor does its internal determination determine the mode of relation and interaction with all other objects, e.g. physical movement around a tornado is indifferent to the body of a rock or that of a dog. The object determines itself in mechanical, chemical, and teleological forms, but as such returns to the internality of the concept, the concrete universal or individual, in its totality insofar as these determinations of objective existence are internal to objectivity. This dialectical circuit of concept and object is the Idea, the Truth as such.
Human beings, as Spirit or mind, are the stepping forward—the existence—of the concept as concept, and so the human being is the concept which conceives itself as concept and so becomes object to itself in being itself. They are the Idea existent as Idea. The concept here objectifies itself, and in objectifying itself also returns to its inward conceptuality in a developmental interplay of social body and individual self-comprehension. The full actualization of the Idea as Idea concerns the self-determination of the individual in pure reason, and this is also embodied as institutions of self-determination in society such that individuals create institutions of freedom and are created as free individuals through these very institutions. All of this is admittedly abstract, so let us leave these abstractions behind and look upon more concrete things.
The Process of Individuation
Universal, particular, individual.
The Universal, a particular, this individual.
The universal: the game of baseball. The particulars: Team A and Team B. The individual: within the particular team every player is individuated into a role ( pitcher, catcher, first baseman, second baseman, third baseman, shortstop, left fielder, center fielder and right fielder). Without the game, there are no teams. Without players there is no game. Within the game the players must be distinguished into teams in order to play. Within the teams the players must be distinguished into separate roles, for if everyone has the same role (everyone being a batter at once, or a pitcher, and so on) then the sense of the game is lost and cannot be played. There are a myriad layers of meaning concerning the concrete universal, but let us keep freedom in mind. What we can learn from this in immediate abstraction are a few things already stated abstractly, but let us consider them more concretely.
First, it is impossible to be an individual outside of universal groupings like communities. Robinson Crusoe out on his lonely island is not an individual person, not a particular person, or even the universal person—in fact, he is not a person at all in this situation, for personality is a social reality. All alone, no human being has a specification as a human being, i.e. they cannot be conceived as a librarian or a farmer, as a politician or a scientist, as Western or Eastern, as colored or white, for like in the game of baseball these are roles internal to the social ‘game’ of a specific kind of life. Alone in the social void of the wild I cannot pitch, catch, or bat, for there are no other players against whom these distinctions would be a reality. To be free is to self-determine, but in such a situation I cannot determine myself as a human being. If empirical evidence is required, we need not go any further than the indeterminacy of a human being which when raised outside of a socializing and enculturating process will not attain humanity without the conditions existent in a community. A human raised by wild animals, after a certain developmental age, will never be able to be determined, let alone determine itself, as a human in the human social world. It is in this manner that an abstract singular entity has no internal determination, cannot self-determine, when it is existentially alone. As this singular something, the being’s determination arises merely as a generalized non-being of all other existents, and in-itself it is indeterminate. This singularity does not manifest as individuality, particularity, or universality of its own kind, but of a more general kind. It is in this case posited by another—its being is put there by an external condition—and reveals itself as necessarily contingent, but not necessary in itself. Were it necessary in itself, then it would reveal the universality, particularity, and individuality moments of itself. The singularity would thereby show itself as universality which within it contains its particularity, a distinction that thereby would individuate the particulars, and the individuals would reveal the concrete reproduction of the universal totality as the individual universal process of self-production through particular individuals. Communities, universals, particularize and individualize. The community is a community of people sharing a common conscious life, but the necessity of existence has the consequence that people are not indifferently replaceable. Natural as well as social particularities further specify us and we take on roles within the community. The failure of society can be measured in the absence of the concreteness of this specification or determination. Freedom is raising ourselves above mere universality, above mere particularity, so that we as individuals are not recognized as replaceable quantities, but as infinitely valuable and irreplaceable qualities.
Second, absolute individuality is a catapult into concrete universality. Singularity will go nowhere because it is a contingency with no interior necessity of its own, but individuality will link itself to the web of existence, consciousness, and knowledge in the pursuit of individuality. The selfishness of individuality, its passionate self-interest, is cognisant of seeking the Absolute. In seeking to be itself through itself and not through or by another, it becomes aware of a plurality which shares at least an implicit desire of the same, but not necessarily in the same determination. The awareness of particularity becomes necessary for the individual to grasp its reality, and it has great interest in knowing these real conditions so as to navigate towards its path more assuredly. The world reveals itself as a chain of conditions upon the individual, but such conditions are also revealed as nothing absolute when knowledge and wit allow one to pull the chain at key moments so that the desired ends of the individual are aided in their becoming. The focused interest in knowing one individuality, our own, leads us to concern ourselves with the conditions internal and external to it, and knowledge and knowing themselves become a revealed condition such that philosophy becomes a necessity. In a world of objects and subjects the individual finds that certain efforts are futile, and so they are abandoned and energy not wasted, but they likewise see the ways in which ends are actually possible and paths to pursue are open. A proper understanding reveals that making enemies of all is counterproductive, that in order for others to help with our dreams we also must in some way acknowledge and help them achieve theirs, and that the tension of an enforced control is infinitely harder than the careful and knowing pull of the chain of conditions which nudge the processes already in play to shift slightly and push forward to our ends with a carrot rather than a stick. In order for the individual to be free, all individuals must be free.
Third, the determination of individuality must be grasped as an individual individuality, not as a universal individuality. The pursuit of individuality therefore involves the taking of a role, a specific place, in the world. This act is a self-determination, a choosing for oneself the limitation of the role, for the body is physically limited, and time is short. This also brings to it the respect, admiration, and reverence of these choices. Here the individual reveals that these determinations are choices that express their deep internal nature, for in committing oneself to do this rather than that, one reveals the real commitments and values one has. Spinoza says, “All things excellent are as difficult as they are rare.” Time and effort create marvels of skill which dazzle the untrained and those lacking will to train themselves in such arts, and this affords our valuing them as they are rare due to the willpower and desire needed to accomplish them. Those who do not struggle for their determination, who do not sacrifice time or effort, may have our envy of their talents, but do not have our respect or admiration in their facile yet meaningless endeavors which show off only a superficial will which produces mediocrity. The person of many mediocre talents is to be less respected than the one who masters one thing and pushes beyond the veil of the current range of knowledge and practice. The master is a master because they have searched and researched every nook and cranny of their craft, they do not sit idly by only to consume from others, but themselves continue when the path of knowledge is exhausted, so that here the act of curious diligence and training reinforces skill and through its exercise cuts new paths. The individual knows they cannot do everything, but must focus themselves on one thing as their inroad to universality and the reality of absoluteness, the reality of freedom. This is why universal freedom requires individual freedom, and individual freedom must live its own life individually, for only individual acts reach the roots of the ground where freedom springs from. As the weaver serves the good by their great weaving and not by their bad baking, so too do we serve the universal end of freedom by specifying what we will do rather than dreaming we will do everything and thereby save the world.
The Empyrean Trail 